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Three views on utility-generated externalities 
Maine Policy Review (1993). Volume 2, Number 1 
"Externalities" are costs imposed on third parties without compensation. Pollution is the 
archetypical externality. It is the pollution externality that has prompted the emerging national 
debate over whether public utility regulation should be modified to account for externalities. 
Jonathan Raab, Myrick Freeman, and Ralph Townsend discuss the arguments surrounding the 
externality debate. These three authors earlier presented similar material at a Legislative 
Institute, sponsored by the Margaret Chase Smith Center for Public Policy's Project for the Study 
of Regulation and the Environment, for the Utilities Committee of the Maine State Legislature.  
Appropriate environmental adders  
by A. Myrick Freeman, III, Bowdoin College  
Introduction  
In an ideal world, the problem of externalities from electricity generation would be managed 
comprehensively, as a component of the larger set of energy and environmental problems. But 
even within the current framework of separate environmental and utility agencies, there are ways 
for utility regulators to account for environmental considerations. Utilities and regulators are 
concerned with the cost and reliability of energy supply, while the environmental agencies are 
looking at air pollutants and water pollutants. Even if public utility regulators take as given the 
federal and state environmental policies, they can and should nevertheless look at the 
environmental implications of new resource acquisition. The logical approach is to use 
externality "adders," where the adders are based on the marginal damages of competing sources 
of supply. That damage, in fact, is part of the cost of supplying electricity.  
Consider a simple example of two plants, one hydro and one coal, that are bidding to supply the 
same amount of electricity to the grid. Under present rules, they would bid based on their private 
costs of production. Suppose that the coal plant costs ten cents, while the hydro is more 
expensive at twelve cents. But there are externality costs. And let us assume that we can measure 
the externalities. Suppose that because of high air emissions, environmental costs are four cents 
for coal, but they are only one cent for the hydro plant. (This might be because of impacts on 
recreation, for example.) From the perspective of total social costs, the coal plant is the higher 
cost alternative. To minimize the cost to society, we should pick the hydro plant. That result will 
occur if the external costs are calculated and included in as adders in the planning process.  
The argument for environmental adders  
Public utilities commissions should be concerned with the environmental implications of the 
decisions they make, even though there are other agencies that also examine environmental 
effects. Using adders in the resource planning process is consistent with least-cost objectives or 
resource acquisition. Some have argued that commissions should not be concerned with these 
environmental issues, because the environment is the responsibility of Environmental Protection 
Agency and other environmental agencies. But accounting for environmental impacts is 
consistent with an expanded view of traditional regulatory objectives: that we want to protect the 
economic welfare of electricity customers. To accomplish that, increments to supply must create 
the lowest social cost to the society, not just the lowest private cost. Thus, when the air pollution 
from a generating station leads to poor health, poor health is an important external cost of that 
generation. A commission is not protecting the customer when it chooses low private costs but 
high environmental costs. Although rates may be lower, the customers ultimately bear the higher 
external costs.  
How should a commission account for these environmental and external impacts? The only way 
that is logically consistent with least-cost planning in resource acquisition is that the adder 
should be based on estimates of environmental damages. Then, how can we calculate these 
environmental damages? Do we know enough to do it?  
Several years ago, the Public Service Commission in New York directed its utilities to study if it 
would be feasible to estimate the environmental costs from different electricity sources and to 
incorporate them into least cost planning. After several years of discussion among utilities and 
the state agencies, a study, of which I am project director, was initiated. The study is at about its 
mid-point. The utilities and the Electric Power Research Institute have contributed $1.3 million 
to the project, which is being spent over a three-year period. The objective is to develop a 
personal computer-based model that estimates site-specific environmental costs. If we are 
successful, planners will be able to input "coal burning power plant, Central Park West, 
Manhattan." Within a few minutes, it would provide results that say, in effect, "Don't put it 
there!" because the external damages will be very high. The planner could then try other fuel 
sources in the least-cost planning process, and the model would provide estimates of external 
cost for each source.  
In the New York study, we are examining all of the damages and benefits from the entire fuel 
cycle. This includes the external effects of coal mining and petroleum exploration and also the 
external costs associated with disposal of fly ash and other wastes. Importantly, the damages (or 
benefits) are generally location specific. At present, Massachusetts, New York and some other 
states apply uniform values to a particular generation source within the state. By contrast, we 
will not develop a table of values, but rather we will develop a model to calculate specific 
damages and benefits for each source and location. We should seek common methods for 
defining and measuring the external damages, rather than common values.  
Is there really enough data to estimate external costs? In the New York study, we are looking at 
the literature on the health effects of air pollution, both on mortality and morbidity. This 
scientific knowledge can be used to estimate the numbers of cases, the various kinds of 
symptoms and illnesses, and even the excess deaths that are associated with given increases in 
levels of certain air pollutants. There is also evidence on how much people are willing to pay to 
avoid these effects and on the economic damages from these adverse affects. We will incorporate 
that literature into the model. So, yes, I do believe that we will be able to construct meaningful 
damage estimates.  
We do face some formidable obstacles in the calculation of damages from carbon dioxide and 
the other greenhouse gases. There is a basic lack of technical knowledge and consensus on the 
natural and physical effects of the increasing concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
However, it may not be necessary to calculate damages due to climate change. For example, a 
national or international agreement to cap or to tax carbon dioxide emissions will resolve the 
problems for utility planning as well. With a cap on emissions globally, any new electricity 
source would have to buy carbon dioxide permits from someone else. With a cap, there would be 
no net increase in emissions so marginal damages would be zero. Similarly, if there is a tax 
based on estimated damages, then the social costs of carbon dioxide emissions would be built 
into the private cost via the tax structure.  
At present, all externality adders are calculated from the costs of abatement. This approach has 
serious problems, because abatement costs are not good measures of marginal damage. New 
York and California both have plans to shift from abatement cost calculations to marginal 
damage calculations. I hope that this trend continues in other states, because it will result in 
better decisions.  
How to incorporate adders  
The appropriate way to incorporate the adder depends on how environmental policies are 
implemented by the environmental agencies. To be precise, the adder used by the utilities should 
be based on the additional environmental damage from the new source that is not already 
incorporated into the cost of production. In some situations, there will be no net addition to 
environmental damage from new sources. The best example is the case of sulfur dioxide 
emissions, because emissions are capped by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. A new 
coal-burning source with sulfur dioxide emissions would have to buy emission permits from 
some other source. Even though there may be an increase in sulfur emissions at the new source, 
there is an offsetting decrease elsewhere. Therefore, there is no net change in environmental 
damage. A similar situation arises if there is a tax on emissions that is based on the marginal 
damage. Because the new source already faces the tax on emissions, the marginal damages are 
already part of the private cost to the utility.  
In traditional command-and-control regulations, a utility removes the level of pollutants required 
by its license. It does not, however, incur any costs for the residual emissions. These residual 
damages are not incorporated in private decision-making. Therefore, the appropriate adder is the 
marginal damage of the unabated pollution. Thus, the adder will depend on specific details of 
environmental policy. The adder approach being adopted in several states is the correct 
application for pollutants subject to command-and-control regulation.  
Conclusion  
The use of externality adders in the least-cost planning process by public utilities is an important 
first step in environmental/utility policy. Adders do not solve all the problems, because they 
enter only in the choice of which new resources to acquire. The logical next step would be to 
incorporate analogous adders for dispatch decisions, that is, for the choice of which plants to run 
to meet current needs. And there are clearly gains from more comprehensive policies, such as 
emissions taxes, so that we do not encourage by-pass of the regulated utilities.  
A. Myrick Freeman, III is a professor of Economics at Bowdoin College. He is also Coordinating 
Director for the New York Environmental Externalities Cost Study. He is the author of several 
books and articles and has testified on environmental issues before a number of national and 
local legislative committees. He holds a doctorate in Economics from the University of 
Washington. 
Full cite:  Freeman, III, A. Myrick. 1993. Three views on utility-generated externalities: 
Appropriate environmental adders. Vol. 2(1): 6-9. 
 
